Yahoo Finance Opinion: Canada offers emotional support program for blown foreign spies
By Peter Shawn Taylor
The release of over 600 pages of classified documents concerning security breaches at Canada’s National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) in Winnipeg this past February shed a light on one of this country’s most shocking cases of espionage.
NML scientists Xiangguo Qiu and Keding Cheng essentially used Canada’s highest-security biohazard lab as a lending library for Chinese military interests. During her time as head of Vaccines and Antivirals in the NML’s Zoonotic Diseases and Special Pathogens Division, Qiu repeatedly acted on China’s behalf, including by transferring knowledge and materials from the NML to Chinese institutions. The files led bare Canada’s shocking inability to protect its own secrets.
Another thing revealed by this trove of documents: the extent to which Canada’s national security interests have been subordinated and contorted by bogus concerns about racism and victimology within the federal bureaucracy. Even blatant spies are now treated with kid gloves for fear they’ll complain.
Qiu and Cheng’s suspicious activities were first revealed during a routine “insider threat briefing” at NML by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in August 2018. Within months CSIS had tapped into their electronic devices and amassed a worrisome brief on their habits. This included numerous violations of security protocols as well as links to researchers connected to the Chinese military.
Despite this wealth of concern, however, the pair almost got off with a caution. In April 2020, a year and a half after they were first named, the federal government was prepared to issue each of them a disciplinary letter and let them back into the lab. Only at the last minute did CSIS uncover new information showing they were involved in China’s many “talent” programs — thinly-disguised espionage schemes meant to steal knowledge from other countries.
At this point, the reprimand letter was shelved and the investigation took a more serious turn. But not so serious that — heaven forbid — anyone might get uncomfortable.
By August 2020, evidence against Qiu and Cheng was rapidly piling up and they were called back for follow-up interviews. “Conduct the interviews in a respectful and professional manner,” read the instructions from the “Investigative Critical Path” timeline released along with the other documents. “Care will be taken to avoid any comments or behaviours that could intimidate or be perceived as badgering or threatening the interviewees.”
The pair were later offered the opportunity to refute CSIS’s conclusions about their actions. Qiu adopted the façade of a dedicated-but-naïve scientist. “It was only during the investigative interview that I started to know some new words to me, such as ‘NATO’, ‘spy’ and ‘espionage,’” she sweetly claimed.
At the same time, Qiu and Cheng made use of the all-purpose accusation of racism. Also in August 2020, the pair launched a union grievance claiming they were victims of “racial profiling” because of their Chinese backgrounds. They also claimed the proceedings were taking too long and that the whole case against them should be thrown out.
It took two months for this stalling technique to be properly discarded. In fact, the main reason the entire investigation took two and a half years to complete is the seemingly endless array of HR procedures and interventions on their behalf. And throughout it all, the bureaucracy repeatedly expressed its deep empathy for the couple. “During the grievance hearing, you described the significant emotional toll that you and your family have experienced as a result of this process. I understand this and sympathize with the feelings that you expressed,” states the official letter denying Qiu’s racism claim.
Keep in mind: at this point it was obvious Qiu and Cheng had deliberately and repeatedly lied to investigators to hide their multifarious connections to China and its military establishment. Qiu was actively working on behalf of the Wuhan lab when, in 2019, she arranged to ship 30 vials of deadly virus samples, including Ebola and Henipah, from NML’s stockpile for reasons that were kept hidden from Canadian authorities. For his part, Cheng carried out a three-year research project at his NML lab on behalf of China’s Centre for Disease Control without NML’s knowledge. They were Canadian citizens acting as foreign agents doing clear harm to Canada’s national security. And the main concern expressed by the bureaucracy was about how they were feeling.
This unseemly interest in Qiu and Cheng’s emotional state continued right up to the point they were both finally fired in January 2021. “I appreciate that this may be a stressful time, and remind you that the Employee Assistance Program is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week” reads the last line of their identical termination letters. The mind boggles.
“Hello, I am a spy whose cover has just been blown. I am finding this a very stressful time and would like to speak to a counsellor …”
Sometime later Qiu and Cheng resurfaced in China, working in their preferred occupations and living under new names. We all hope they have recovered from the shock of being treated so harshly by Canada.
Financial Post
Peter Shawn Taylor is senior features editor at C2C Journal, where a longer version of this story first appeared.
