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Uber Technologies, Inc. (UBER)

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33.65-0.51 (-1.49%)
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33.66 +0.01 (0.03%)
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  • A
    Anonymous
    Uber's Core Ride-Share has fallen apart after 11 years with only billion$ lost. Now they want to change their core business with a market cap over 60 billion & they lost $23.2 million in the last 4 years!
  • A
    Anonymous
    Should California's prop 22 pass then all it gets Uber is what they have right now. So its either staying put or personnel expenses go up.....a lot.

    So Uber loses lots of money, prop 22 just helps them lose more!!

    If a company cant turn a profit in great times, then how do they in bad times??
  • A
    Anonymous
    One can’t help but wonder why these multibillion-dollar companies, who can dig deep into their piggy banks to spend on this ruinous ballot measure but not on their drivers, consistently come to the bargaining table offering pocket change. Well, there’s more to this story.

    It turns out that, despite how badly they underpay and mistreat their drivers, Uber and Lyft are still in huge financial trouble. They have been losing billions of dollars every year, even as their stocks have collapsed. Profit margins are inherently low in the taxi business, and their predatory business model massively subsidizes more than half the cost of each and every ride in their bid to boost market share and undercut the competition. As a result, traditional taxi companies and livery drivers have been pushed to the desperate edge of bankruptcy, and airport shuttle companies have been driven out of business.
    Great article by Steven Hill published in Common Dreams
  • A
    Anonymous
    Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) is a non-GAAP intermediate contribution measure that has no obvious relevance to Uber, and even if accurately calculated should be ignored by investors. EBITDA is sometimes used by companies with very large fixed assets, large intangible assets (such as goodwill acquired after a major merger) or significant debt financing to give outsiders a crude sense of a company’s ability to meet its outstanding financial obligations. Uber has none of these characteristics.

    More importantly, Uber’s reported “EBITDA” numbers exclude billions of expenses other than interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. Its primary EBITDA measure excludes the $5 billion in stock-based employee compensation. Its “Segment Adjusted EBITDA” measure also excludes all of the IT expense supporting the Uber platform, and the corporate expenses (accounting, lobbying, etc.) directly supporting all of its current operations.

    Uber calls these measures “EBITDA” in the hopes of misleading outsiders who would normally expect a small and fairly consistent gap between true EBITDA and GAAP profitability, and misleading people who might assume that overall “EBITDA and “Segment Adjusted EBITDA” would have been calculated the same way. If Uber were not trying to mislead outsiders it could have labeled them as “Earnings Minus a Bunch of Compensation, Indirect Operating and Non-Operating Expenses” or “Segment Revenue Minus Short-term Variable Costs” rather than using a well-established accounting term that means something materially different.

    Uber’s presents “Segment Adjusted EBITAR” measures as a means of measuring the profitability of Uber’s different business units. Uber works aggressively to misrepresent it as a “profit” measure even though in 2019 it excluded $8.8 billion (40%) of the expenses relevant to an actual profit calculation. The press release announcing 2019 results claimed “Rides Adjusted EBITDA delivered a $742 million profit” instead of the more truthful “delivered a $742 million contribution against costs not directly related to specific trips”.

    This series has highlighted Uber’s ability to get the financial press to endorse and amplify its false narrative claims. While Uber’s SEC filings have the actual definitions of each measure buried in footnotes, Uber knows that that almost no one in the financial press will dig them out and make sure readers accurately understand Uber’s claims.

    One Wall Street Journal writer accepted Khosrowshahi’s Segment EBITAR/profit conflation at face value, reporting “Uber last year made money on its rides when unrelated costs were excluded, he has said” [2].

    Another Wall Street Journal reporter’s article about Uber’s third quarter earnings emphasized that Khosrowshahi “is more upbeat about 2021, expecting to turn a profit” did not mention the $1.9 billion quarterly loss until the fifth paragraph, and did not mention that “profit” did not actually meant “profit” until much later. It also repeated Uber’s claim that “ride-hailing.is its only profitable business unit before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization” without explaining that “ride-sharing EBITDA” also excluded significant employee compensation costs and all of the IT and other corporate costs needed to support ride-hailing. [3]

    The Wall Street Journal reporter covering Thursday’s earnings release was even more incompetent. Even though the officially reported annual loss had skyrocketed to $8.5 billion, her story was headlined “Uber Moves Closer to Profitability as Revenue Climbs.” [4]

    Khosrowshahi’s promise of profitability by the end of 2020 should be considered in the light of all of Uber’s earlier predictions of “profits just around the corner”

    In the analysts’ conference callon 2019 results, Dara Khosrowshahi promised that the 4th Quarter of 2020 would be Uber’s first “EBITDA positive quarter.” He claimed Rides would achieve 45% EBITDA margins and Eats would achieve 30% margins.

    In 2015 Travis Kalanick predicted that Uber’s North American operations would be profitable by 2017. [5] Several months after becoming CEO in 2017 Dara Khosrowshahi said that his goal was for Uber “to nearly break even in 2018 and be profitable by 2019” ahead of its planned public offering. [6]

    Uber studies in 2018 used in discussions with prospective lenders delayed breakeven expectations by a year. “Under that same likely “base case” scenario, Uber management believed it could turn profitable by 2020, when it would make $1.5 billion in EBITDA. …Uber is banking on net revenue growth more than making up from the rise in expenses.” [7]

    Uber avoided making any statements about future P&L improvements in its SEC-scrutinized IPO prospectus, but made a variety of claims in its IPO roadshow, including that future growth “will generate a profit margin of 7% as a percentage of all gross bookings” [8].

    Following the dismal performance of the IPO the promised breakeven was pushed back
  • A
    Anonymous
    One can’t help but wonder why these multibillion dollar companies, who can dig deep into their piggy banks to spend on this ruinous ballot measure but not on their drivers, consistently come to the bargaining table offering pocket change. Well, there’s more to this story.

    It turns out that, despite how badly they underpay and mistreat their drivers, Uber and Lyft are still in huge financial trouble. They have been losing billions of dollars every year, even as their stocks have collapsed. Profit margins are inherently low in the taxi business, and their predatory business model massively subsidizes more than half the cost of each and every ride in their bid to boost market share and undercut the competition. As a result, traditional taxi companies and livery drivers have been pushed to the desperate edge of bankruptcy, and airport shuttle companies have been driven out of business.
    Great article by Steven Hill published in Common Dreams
  • A
    Anonymous
    wfc a huge bank its price now in $20s great deal. now compare in every way uber and wells Fargo whats better and has assets and great real balance sheet lol
  • A
    Anonymous
    25$ soon
  • A
    Anonymous
    Prop 22 passage won't relieve Uber of their 10 billion+ of debt, in fact it has added to it!
    It also won't reduce their enormous losses by a penny, in fact it will add to them.
    On the other hand, if it fails to pass....... Armageddon.
  • A
    Anonymous
    Prob 22 will make uber cry soon and drivers will be employed by them things will be fair again ;). alot changes coming this vote i hope people are smart. don't let these corrupt companies win and get things their way . they had their chance to be the good guy for a long time and they failed. sorry no more chance to let these corrupt companies win. make driver employees is best thing ever finally they get fair benefit and pay. . shortz will make bank on uber hahah
  • A
    Anonymous
    Uber's Core Ride-Share has fallen apart after 11 years with only billion$ lost. Now they want to change their core business with a market cap over 60 billion & they lost $23.2 million in the last 4 years!
  • A
    Anonymous
    It is not about profit with Uber. There Rideshare is going to slow down again. Uber is all over the airwaves with Uber Eats. Guess Core Rideshare is history, along with Uber Elevate--- The big pie in the sky.
  • A
    Anonymous
    Drivers hate the idea of passing Prop 22 in California. This initiative is creating a lot of bad blood between the drivers and Uber/Lyft. Uber sends out a constant stream of notifications to drivers with propaganda about Prop 22. Some drivers are suing Uber because of the coercive nature of the notifications. Prop 22 would deny drivers their rights, most benefits, and codify the new law in such a way that it would take 7/8 of the state legislature to make any changes to it. What kind of representative democracy is that folks?
  • A
    Anonymous
    One can’t help but wonder why these multibillion-dollar companies, who can dig deep into their piggy banks to spend on this ruinous ballot measure but not on their drivers, consistently come to the bargaining table offering pocket change. Well, there’s more to this story.

    It turns out that, despite how badly they underpay and mistreat their drivers, Uber and Lyft are still in huge financial trouble. They have been losing billions of dollars every year, even as their stocks have collapsed. Profit margins are inherently low in the taxi business, and their predatory business model massively subsidizes more than half the cost of each and every ride in their bid to boost market share and undercut the competition. As a result, traditional taxi companies and livery drivers have been pushed to the desperate edge of bankruptcy, and airport shuttle companies have been driven out of business.
    Great article by Steven Hill published in Common Dreams
  • A
    Anonymous
    Did I mention I’m SHORT Uber since $37.55...!!!
    Yea baby!!
  • A
    Anonymous
    Should California's prop 22 pass then all it gets Uber is what they have right now. So its either staying put or personnel expenses go up.....a lot.

    So Uber loses lots of money, prop 22 just helps them lose more!!

    If a company cant turn a profit in great times, then how do they in bad times??
  • A
    Anonymous
    Uber's Core Ride-Share has fallen apart after 11 years with only billion$ lost. Now they want to change their core business with a market cap over 60 billion & they lost $23.2 million in the last 4 years!
  • A
    Anonymous
    Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) is a non-GAAP intermediate contribution measure that has no obvious relevance to Uber, and even if accurately calculated should be ignored by investors. EBITDA is sometimes used by companies with very large fixed assets, large intangible assets (such as goodwill acquired after a major merger) or significant debt financing to give outsiders a crude sense of a company’s ability to meet its outstanding financial obligations. Uber has none of these characteristics.

    More importantly, Uber’s reported “EBITDA” numbers exclude billions of expenses other than interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. Its primary EBITDA measure excludes the $5 billion in stock-based employee compensation. Its “Segment Adjusted EBITDA” measure also excludes all of the IT expense supporting the Uber platform, and the corporate expenses (accounting, lobbying, etc.) directly supporting all of its current operations.

    Uber calls these measures “EBITDA” in the hopes of misleading outsiders who would normally expect a small and fairly consistent gap between true EBITDA and GAAP profitability, and misleading people who might assume that overall “EBITDA and “Segment Adjusted EBITDA” would have been calculated the same way. If Uber were not trying to mislead outsiders it could have labeled them as “Earnings Minus a Bunch of Compensation, Indirect Operating and Non-Operating Expenses” or “Segment Revenue Minus Short-term Variable Costs” rather than using a well-established accounting term that means something materially different.

    Uber’s presents “Segment Adjusted EBITAR” measures as a means of measuring the profitability of Uber’s different business units. Uber works aggressively to misrepresent it as a “profit” measure even though in 2019 it excluded $8.8 billion (40%) of the expenses relevant to an actual profit calculation. The press release announcing 2019 results claimed “Rides Adjusted EBITDA delivered a $742 million profit” instead of the more truthful “delivered a $742 million contribution against costs not directly related to specific trips”.

    This series has highlighted Uber’s ability to get the financial press to endorse and amplify its false narrative claims. While Uber’s SEC filings have the actual definitions of each measure buried in footnotes, Uber knows that that almost no one in the financial press will dig them out and make sure readers accurately understand Uber’s claims.

    One Wall Street Journal writer accepted Khosrowshahi’s Segment EBITAR/profit conflation at face value, reporting “Uber last year made money on its rides when unrelated costs were excluded, he has said” [2].

    Another Wall Street Journal reporter’s article about Uber’s third quarter earnings emphasized that Khosrowshahi “is more upbeat about 2021, expecting to turn a profit” did not mention the $1.9 billion quarterly loss until the fifth paragraph, and did not mention that “profit” did not actually meant “profit” until much later. It also repeated Uber’s claim that “ride-hailing.is its only profitable business unit before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization” without explaining that “ride-sharing EBITDA” also excluded significant employee compensation costs and all of the IT and other corporate costs needed to support ride-hailing. [3]

    The Wall Street Journal reporter covering Thursday’s earnings release was even more incompetent. Even though the officially reported annual loss had skyrocketed to $8.5 billion, her story was headlined “Uber Moves Closer to Profitability as Revenue Climbs.” [4]

    Khosrowshahi’s promise of profitability by the end of 2020 should be considered in the light of all of Uber’s earlier predictions of “profits just around the corner”

    In the analysts’ conference callon 2019 results, Dara Khosrowshahi promised that the 4th Quarter of 2020 would be Uber’s first “EBITDA positive quarter.” He claimed Rides would achieve 45% EBITDA margins and Eats would achieve 30% margins.

    In 2015 Travis Kalanick predicted that Uber’s North American operations would be profitable by 2017. [5] Several months after becoming CEO in 2017 Dara Khosrowshahi said that his goal was for Uber “to nearly break even in 2018 and be profitable by 2019” ahead of its planned public offering. [6]

    Uber studies in 2018 used in discussions with prospective lenders delayed breakeven expectations by a year. “Under that same likely “base case” scenario, Uber management believed it could turn profitable by 2020, when it would make $1.5 billion in EBITDA. …Uber is banking on net revenue growth more than making up from the rise in expenses.” [7]

    Uber avoided making any statements about future P&L improvements in its SEC-scrutinized IPO prospectus, but made a variety of claims in its IPO roadshow, including that future growth “will generate a profit margin of 7% as a percentage of all gross bookings” [8].

    Following the dismal performance of the IPO the promised breakeven was pushed back
  • A
    Anonymous
    Since California courts have found Uber in violation of California law, can Calpers and the California Teachers pension funds continue to own the stocks?
  • A
    Anonymous
    after earning call. will see 25$
  • A
    Anonymous
    UBER & LYFT are doomed regardless of prop 22. Calif courts are after UBER & LYFT. There's no way out. UBER is going to be 25 next week guaranteed. LOL