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Politics is no longer about left or right, as the Tories have realised to their advantage

<span>Photograph: Oliver Pinel/AP</span>
Photograph: Oliver Pinel/AP

Labour’s losses in England will be seen as evidence by some that the party should have moved faster to the centre, and by others that it needed to offer a more inspiring leftwing vision. The problem with this discourse is that the UK electorate doesn’t fit into one single left-right axis.

Dominic Cummings made this point very explicitly in discussing the behavioural science underpinning his Brexit campaign. There are two separate dimensions: one focused on economic policies such as welfare, income inequality, nationalising industries and the deficit, the other on social matters such as immigration, minority rights, and crime and punishment. Understanding this distinction was key to the leave campaign winning the EU referendum: it pivoted to the left on economics (promising £350m for the NHS), but to the right on social issues, by opposing free movement.

This blend of economic liberalism and social conservatism has remained central to the Conservatives’ positioning under Boris Johnson. The levelling-up agenda and the huge state investments during the pandemic have left Labour squeezed on the left of the economic axis. In parallel the Tories have sought to retain and expand their base of culturally conservative voters through the aggressively promoted “culture wars”. The most extreme policy example of this has been Robert Jenrick’s promise to save Britain’s statues. The mobilisation of opposition to restrict protests under the banner “kill the bill”, and images of violent opposition in Bristol, may well have been the kinds of reactions conservatives were hoping for to reinforce this cultural divide.

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The protection of statues and public order is part of a broader socially conservative way of thinking that is more likely to see the world as a dangerous place, which motivates the desire to protect national traditions and norms from potential threats. Johnson’s commitment to increase our stockpile of nuclear weapons can be understood as part of a wider appeal to cultural conservatives. In fact, images of UK naval vessels protecting Jersey on 6 May were perhaps the best shift in the news cycle the Conservative party could have hoped for on election day.

Culturally conservative voters have been moving away from the Labour party since 2010, when they began to support Ukip. Since Brexit they’ve increasingly shifted toward the Conservatives. However, from 2015’s “controls on immigration” mug, to the recent “flag waving” leaked strategy, I suspect the party has done more to anger and confuse culturally liberal parts of its coalition, and has paradoxically triggered the kinds of internal conflict that make it even less attractive to socially conservative voters, who value order and unity.

Research from UK in a Changing Europe has highlighted that Labour MPs and members are generally to the left of their voters on cultural issues. In fact they are much further to the left of the electorate as a whole on cultural issues. Where Labour is much more in tune is on economic issues. In fact Conservative MPs are actually much further to the right of their voters – and the country – on economic matters.

One potential strategy for Labour is therefore to try to ignore cultural issues, and win back trust on the economic issues that are much clearer unifiers for its potential voter coalition. As Paula Surridge discussed recently, however, improving subjective evaluations of trust and competence is going to be tough if people feel more generally that Labour is out of touch with their cultural values.

Some within the party clearly fear that attempting to navigate this axis necessitates compromising their values. It is therefore important to note that although cultural conservatism is associated with holding more prejudicial views, it is certainly not synonymous with it. The proportion of the population who hold explicitly racist views is much smaller than those who hold socially conservative views. In fact, even in the context of Brexit, it is often overlooked that in 2019 about 70% of the UK population were comfortable with people coming here from the EU to work or study.

Central to this axis is the notion of traditional British values. Sociologist Tariq Modood has been pointing out for years that unless Labour offers its own positive narrative around British values, this space will inevitably be filled by other voices. Importantly, research into positive collective identities shows that they operate very differently to narcissistic collective identities. Taking pride in one’s place and country does not necessarily imply a narcissistic belief that one’s own country is superior to others.

The Blair era is often looked at for inspiration by those focused on getting Labour back into power. The dialogue here often highlights the former leader’s moves to the centre on certain economic issues, but there are flaws inherent in this strategy – it neglects our current economic reality, popular opinion and the fact that voters may be looking for stronger leadership in a crisis. However, there may be more fruitful lessons from his positioning on the cultural axis. Blair’s mantra of “Tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime” is arguably one of the most skilful manoeuvres in British politics to appeal to the left and right.

Could Labour pull off such a bridging move on immigration? Could it make compassion for refugees and contributions to foreign aid an issue of national pride, while aiming to reduce levels of immigration by being tough on the causes of refugee crises around the world? Or does the party need to rebuild its coalition with a bold but credible economic vision, or an economic vision that more clearly connects with socially conservative values? Either way, Labour cannot navigate the UK’s post-Brexit electoral values with a single left-right compass.

  • Lee de Wit is a lecturer in political psychology at Cambridge University